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The multihistory approach to the time-travel paradoxes of General Relativity:
mathematical analysis of a toy model
Gavriel Segre
With a mathematical eye to Matt Visser’s multihistory approach to the time-travel-paradoxes of
General Relativity, a non relativistic toy model is analyzed in order of characterizing the conditions
in which, in such a toy model, causation occurs.
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3I. CAUSATION VERSUS CHRONOLOGY VIOLATIONS IN GENERAL RELATIVITY
The only consistent definition of the concept of causality is based on the Cauchy-Kowalewski theorem (see for
instance the section 1.7 of [1]) stating that the initial value problem of a broad class of (partial) differential equations
has one and only one solution: in that case one defines causation as the inter-relation existing between the initial
value and the later predicted value of the involved quantity 1.
Let us remark that, in the general case, the evolution parameter involved in the Cauchy problem doesn’t necessarily
coincide with the physical time.
Often it is is implicitly assumed the following:
Conjecture I.1
Conjecture of Causation:
The (partial) differential equations expressing the Laws of Nature have to admit, thanks to the Cauchy-Kowalewski
theorem, a well-defined initial value problem.
Indeed this is the situation to which we were used since the constraint involved in the conjecture I.1 is satisfied by
both Newtonian Mechanics and Special Relativity.
It is even satisfied by Quantum Mechanics where, beside the nondeterministic reduction process, the evolution of
a system non subjected to measurements is ruled by the Schro¨dinger equation that of course admits a well-defined
initial value problem.
One of the philosophical peculiarities of General Relativity [3], [4] is that, without assuming ad hoc suppletive
axioms in order to avoid such a situation, it violates ConjectureI.1: Einstein’s equation Rab −
1
2Rgab = 8piTab admits
solutions (M, gab) that are not globally-hyperbolic (i.e. that don’t admit a Cauchy surface, namely a closed achronal
set S whose domain of dependence is the whole spacetime D(S) = M):
in this case for every choice of a three-dimensional C∞ submanifold S the predictability of the structure of spacetime
(and hence the causation) allowed from the initial value problem on S is limited to the interior of the Cauchy-horizon
of S:
HCauchy(S) := ∂D(S) (1.1)
The fact that in such a situation the scalar wave equation may have a well-defined Cauchy problem [5] is a very
little consolation.
An additional peculiarity of General Relativity concerns chronology violations:
given a time-orientable space-time (M, gab):
Definition I.1
chronology violating set of (M, gab):
Vchronology(M, gab) := ∪p∈MI
+(p) ∩ I−(p) (1.2)
A curious feature of General Relativity is that there exist solutions (M, gab) of Einstein’s equation such that
Vchronology(M, gab) 6= ∅.
Given such a solution and two points p1, p2 ∈M :
Definition I.2
chronological relation:
p1 chronological p2 := p2 ∈ I
+(p1) ∨ p1 = p2 (1.3)
Then:
1 Contrary to the typical philosophical attitude of complicating simple things (see for instance [2]) as to the definition of predictability
we assume that the initial condition may be known with exactness and we don’t care about the possible incomputability of the map
expressing the final state (the effect) as a function of the initial state (the cause).
4Proposition I.1
• chronological is a partial ordering relation over M − Vchronology(M, gab)
• chronological is a preordering over Vchronology(M, gab) but is not a partial ordering
•
Vchronology(M, gab)
∼chronological
= {I+(p) ∩ I−(p) p ∈ Vchronology(M, gab)} (1.4)
PROOF:
Let us observe, first of all, that definitionI.2 differs slightly from the usual way through which the chronological
relation (traditionally denoted by <<) is defined in the literature (see for instance the section 2.1 of [6], [7] , the
section3.2 ”Causality Theory of Space-times” of [8] and [9]) that would correspond to our p1 ≺chronological p2 :=
p1 chronological p2 ∧ p1 6= p2 2; then:
p chronological p ∀p ∈M (1.5)
Demanding to the appendix A for the involved notions concerning preorderings, the thesis follows by the fact that [3]
Vchronology(M, gab) is the disjoint union of sets of the form I
+(p) ∩ I−(p) for p ∈ Vchronology(M, gab) and that:
p1 ∼chronological p2 ∀p1, p2 ∈ I
+(p) ∩ I−(p), ∀p ∈ Vchronology(M, gab) (1.6)

The situation delineated by propositionI.1 is often said to generate the so called time travel paradoxes.
These paradoxes can be divided in two classes:
• consistency paradoxes involving the effects of the changes of the past (epitomized by the celebrated Grandfather
Paradox in which a time-traveller goes back in the past and prevents the meeting of his grandfather and his
grandmother)
• bootstrap paradoxes involving the presence of loops in which the source of the production of some information
disappears (as an example let us suppose that Einstein learnt Relativity Theory from [3], [4] given to him by a
time-traveller gone back to 1904).
Remark I.1
As correctly stated in the section 6.4 ”Causality conditions” of [3] these paradoxes occur only if one assumes a
simple notion of human free-will.
The existence of human free will is therein claimed to be a corner stone of the Philosophy of Science underlying the
Scientific Method based on the assumption that one is free to perform any experiment.
We don’t agree with such a claim since, in our opinion, the hypothetical assumption that we are determined to
make the experiments we perform is not incompatible with such a Philosophy of Science.
Furthermore, at first sight, human free will would seem to be incompatible with the determinism of General
Relativity.
A deeper investigation about this claim requires:
• a precise definition of both the concepts of determinism and free-will
• the analysis whether, according to the assumed definitions of both the terms, determinism and free will are
compatible (the position of Compatibilists) or not (the position of Incompatibilists) 3
2 the chronological relation may be in seen in some contexts as a conceptually more fundamental mathematical structure than the metric
(from which, anyway, its definition obviously depends); an instance is given by the definition of causal boundaries [10] where other kinds
of non Hausdorffness, differing from those discussed in this paper, occur.
3 We are using here the standard philosophical terminology [11]; such a terminology introduces also the set of the Libertarians defined as
the subset of the Incompatibilists consisting in those believing in the existence of the free will while denying the existence of determinism.
Apart from a general skeptisism about the whole philosophical approach to these themes, we regret the adoption of a term like libertarian,
to which a positive ethical connotation is usually ascribed, to denote a conceptual position whose truth or falsity should be neutrally
decided analyzing the features of the Physical Theories describing Nature.
5The determinism of a physical theory may be defined as the condition that there exist dynamical equations (suitable
(partial) differential equations) governing the evolution of any closed system.
Let us remark that, contrary to Laplace’s classical definition (see the celebrated second chapter ”Concerning prob-
ability” of [12]), such a definition of determinism doesn’t assume the Conjecture I.1.
The simple notion of human free-will above mentioned consists in the assumption that the true scientific theory
describing human mind is deterministic.
Obviously such a simple notion of free-will leads, by definition, to the incompatibilist thesis.
There exist, anyway, more refined definitions of free-will that, once assumed, make the compatibilistic thesis con-
sistent.
The problem of the so called time-travel paradoxes has been faced by the scientific community in different ways
(see the fourth part ”Time Travel” of [13] as well as [14]):
1. adding to General Relativity some ad hoc axiom precluding the physical possibility of causal loops (such as the
strong form of Penrose’s Cosmic Censorship Conjecture)
2. appealing to consistency conditions (such as in Novikov’s Consistency Conjecture) requiring that causal loops,
though allowing causal influence on the past, don’t allow alteration of the past
3. arguing that the problem is removed at a quantum level (such as in Hawking’s Chronology Protecting Conjecture
stating that the classical possibilities to implement time-travels are destroyed by quantum effects)
4. arguing that the so called time-travel paradoxes are only apparent and may be bypassed in a mathematical
consistent way
We have nor the knowledge neither the competence to take sides about such a subtle issue.
In our opinion, anyway, of particular interest from a mathematical viewpoint is the particular approach of the
fourth kind according to which the so called time-travel paradoxes are bypassed with the removal of the assumption
that space-time, as a topological space, has to be Hausdorff (and hence allowing Universe’s bifurcations in multiple
histories; see the section 19.1 ”The radical rewrite conjecture” of [13] based on previous remarks by Robert Geroch
and Roger Penrose [15] as well as by Petr Hajicek [16] 4) in that it allows an interesting investigation about the
topological structure of the evolution parameter’s space required in order that, eventually under suitable consistency
conditions, conjecture I.1 holds.
4 As it has happened many times, the idea underlying such an approach has appeared first in Science-Fiction’s literature than in Science’s
literature: it is for this reason that we suggest the lecture of the parts of [17] concerning the logical analysis of time-travel issues in the
Science Fiction’s literature.
6II. VISSER SPLITTINGS
Given a topological space (see appendix B) (X, T ), a subset of its Ω ⊂ X such that ∂Ω 6= ∅ and a natural number
n ∈ N : n ≥ 2:
Definition II.1
Visser n-splitting of X through Ω:
Split(X,Ω, n) := [X − Ω¯] ∪ [∪ni=1Ω¯i] (2.1)
where Ω1, · · · ,Ωn are n disjoint copies of Ω.
Definition II.2
natural topology of Split(X,Ω, n):
the topology T˜ (X,Ω, n) having the following basis: any open set in [X − Ω¯] ∪ Ω¯i, i = 1, · · · , n is an open set of
T˜ (X,Ω, n).
From here and beyond we will assume that any Visser splitting is endowed with its natural topology.
It is important to observe that:
Proposition II.1
non Hausdorffness of Visser splittings:
the topological space (Split(X,Ω, n), T˜ (X,Ω, n)) is not Hausdorff
PROOF:
Given i, j = 1, · · · , n : i 6= j, let us consider two points xi ∈ ∂Ωi, xj ∈ ∂Ωj such that xi and xj are copies of the same
element x ∈ ∂Ω; the definition II.2 implies that xi g xj . 
Let us now suppose that  is a partial ordering over X (see appendix A). Given x, y ∈ Split(X,Ω, n):
Definition II.3
x˜y := x  y (2.2)
Then:
Proposition II.2
• ˜ is a preordering over Split(X,Ω, n)
• ˜ is not a partial ordering over Split(X,Ω, n)
PROOF:
The reflexive and the transitive property of ˜ may be immediately inferred by the corresponding properties of .
˜ doesn’t satisfy, anyway, the antisymmetric property since given x ∈ Ω and considered the corresponding copies
xi ∈ Ωi i = 1, · · · , n:
(xi˜xj ∧ xj˜xi ; xi = xj) i, j = 1, · · · , n : i 6= j (2.3)

Remark II.1
Gordon Mc Cabe has recently [18] introduced the following alternative to Visser splitting:
Definition II.4
7Mc Cabe n-splitting of X through Ω:
SplitMc Cabe(X,Ω, n) :=
Split(X,Ω, n)
∼Mc Cabe
(2.4)
where ∼Mc Cabe is the equivalence relation over Split(X,Ω, n) defined by:
xi ∼Mc Cabe xj ⇔ xi ∈ ∂Ωi, xj ∈ ∂Ωj ∧ xi and xj are copies of the same element x ∈ ∂Ω i, j = 1, · · · , n : i 6= j
(2.5)
Definition II.5
natural topology of SplitMc Cabe(X,Ω, n):
T˜Mc Cabe(X,Ω, n) :=
T˜ (X,Ω, n)
∼Mc Cabe
(2.6)
Then:
Proposition II.3
∼Mc Cabe is Hausdorff (2.7)
PROOF:
Since:
xg y ⇒ x ∼Mc Cabe y ∀x, y ∈ Split(X,Ω, n) (2.8)
the thesis follows 
Actually Mc Cabe’s formalism is nothing but an application of the strategy indicated by Geroch in the exercise 177
of the 27th section ”Continuous Mappings” of [19] :
”make equivalent as few points as necessary to get an Hausdorff quotient space”
For this reason we won’t adopt Mc Cabe splittings in this paper.
8III. VISSER SPLITTINGS OF TIME AND INITIAL VALUE PROBLEMS: A TOY MODEL
We will consider for simplicity from here and beyond a particular toy model consisting of a classical non-relativistic
dynamical system having as configuration space the real line (R, Tnatural(R)) and whose evolution parameter t (that
in this particular case will hence coincide with the physical absolute time) takes values on some Visser splitting of the
real line (Split(R,Ω, n), T˜ (R,Ω, n)).
The usual linear ordering ≤ over R induces, by proposition II.2, the preordering ≤˜ over Split(R,Ω, n) that, in
according to the explained underlying physical interpretation, we will denote by chronological.
Given a map x : (Split(R,Ω, n), T˜ (R,Ω, n)) 7→ (R,+, ·), according to the analysis performed in the appendix C it
is well defined the concept of time derivative of x(t) that we will denote by x˙(t).
Given a map f ∈ C∞(R), a point tin ∈ Split(R,Ω, n) and a real number xin ∈ R we will investigate under which
conditions on Ω the initial value problem:
x˙ = f(x) (3.1)
x(tin) = xin (3.2)
is well-posed, i.e. it admits one and only one solution x(t) : (Split(R,Ω, n), T˜ (R,Ω, n)) 7→ (R,+, ·).
Let us start considering the simplest case Ω := {0}, n := 2.
Let us start from the case tin /∈ {01, 02}.
Called x˜(t) : R 7→ R the solution of the Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for ordinary time t ∈ R:
Proposition III.1
HP:
tin ∈ Split(R, {0}, 2)− {01, 02} (3.3)
TH:
The Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for t ∈ Split(R, {0}, 2} is well-defined, its unique solution being the map
˜˜x(t) : Split(R, {0}, 2) 7→ R:
˜˜x(t) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ R− {0} (3.4)
˜˜x(01) := x˜(0) (3.5)
˜˜x(02) := x˜(0) (3.6)
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by the definition C.3 and the structure of the topology T˜ (R, {0}, 2). 
Let us now suppose that tin := 01 and let x˜(t) : R 7→ R be the solution of the Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (3.7)
x(0) = xin (3.8)
Then:
Proposition III.2
9HP:
tin := 01 (3.9)
TH:
The Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for t ∈ Split(R, {0}, 2} is well-defined, its unique solution being the map
˜˜x(t) : Split(R, {0}, 2) 7→ R:
˜˜x(t) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ R− {0} (3.10)
˜˜x(01) := x˜(0) (3.11)
˜˜x(02) := x˜(0) (3.12)
PROOF:
It follows from the definition C.3 and the structure of the topology T˜ (R, {0}, 2). 
The generalization to n ∈ N : n > 2 is straightforward.
Let us now consider the case in which Ω := [0,+∞), n := 2.
If tin ∈ (−∞, 0) let x˜(t) : R 7→ R be the solution of the Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for ordinary time t ∈ R.
Then:
Proposition III.3
HP:
tin ∈ (−∞, 0) (3.13)
TH:
The Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for t ∈ Split(R, [0,+∞), 2) is well-defined, its unique solution being the map
˜˜x(t) : Split(R, [0,+∞), 2) 7→ R:
˜˜x(t) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ (−∞, 0) (3.14)
˜˜x(t1) := x˜(t = t1) ∀t1 ∈ [01,+∞1) (3.15)
˜˜x(t2) := x˜(t = t2) ∀t2 ∈ [02,+∞2) (3.16)
PROOF:
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The thesis immediately follows by the definition C.3 and the structure of the topology T˜ (R, {0}, 2). 
Given a, b ∈ R let us consider the generalized Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (3.17)
x(01) = a (3.18)
x(02) = b (3.19)
Given an arbitrary r ∈ R let x˜(t)r : R 7→ R be the solution of the Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (3.20)
x(0) = r (3.21)
for ordinary time t ∈ R.
Then:
Proposition III.4
The generalized Cauchy problem eq.3.17, eq.3.18, eq. 3.19 for t ∈ Split(R, [0,+∞), 2) is well-defined if and only if
a = b; in this case the unique solution is the map ˜˜x(t) : Split(R, [0,+∞), 2) 7→ R such that:
˜˜x(t) := x˜(t)a=b ∀t ∈ (−∞, 0) (3.22)
˜˜x(t1) := x˜(t = t1)a=b ∀t1 ∈ [01,+∞1) (3.23)
˜˜x(t2) := x˜(t = t2)a=b ∀t2 ∈ [02,+∞2) (3.24)
PROOF:
The retrodiction to (−∞, 0) is possible if and only if:
x˜(t)a = x˜(t)b ∀t ∈ (−∞, 0) (3.25)
and hence if and only if a = b. 
Let us now suppose that tin ∈ [01,+∞1) and let x˜(t) : R 7→ R be the solution of the Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq.
3.2 for ordinary time t ∈ R. Then:
Proposition III.5
HP:
tin ∈ [01,+∞1) (3.26)
TH:
The Cauchy problem eq. 3.1, eq. 3.2 for t ∈ Split(R, [0,+∞), 2) is well-defined, its unique solution being the map
˜˜x(t) : Split(R, [0,+∞), 2)→ R:
˜˜x(t) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ (−∞, 0) (3.27)
˜˜x(t1) := x˜(t = t1) ∀t1 ∈ [01,+∞1) (3.28)
˜˜x(t2) := x˜(t = t2) ∀t2 ∈ [02,+∞2) (3.29)
PROOF:
The solution on the first branch [01,+∞1) allows the retrodiction on (−∞, 0) from which the prediction on [02,+∞2)
can be derived. 
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IV. THE TOY MODEL WITH A TREE-LIKE TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF TIME
The situation discussed in the previous section may be easily generalized to the case of multiple Visser splitting of
time:
given n ∈ N+, t1, · · · , tn ∈ R such that t1 < t2 < · · · < tn, n natural numbers greater or equal than two
b1, b2, · · · , bn ∈ N : bi ≥ 2 i = 1, · · · , n and n− 1 natural numbers i1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , b1}, · · · , in−1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , bn}:
Definition IV.1
temporal tree:
tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn) :=
Split(· · ·Split(Split(R, [t1,+∞), b1), [t2,(i1),+∞(i1)), b2) · · · , [tn,(in−1),+∞(in−1)), bn) (4.1)
Remark IV.1
It important not to make confusion between the two different kind of labels: those denoting the time ordering and
those denoting the different branches; to avoid confusion we will denote this second kind of label enclosing it between
brackets.
So the first time splitting occurs at t1 of which we will have b1 copies that we will denote by t1,(1), · · · , t1,(b1) and
so on.
Remark IV.2
Let us remark that the iterated adoption of the definition II.2 induces a topology on
tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn) that we will denote by T (t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn).
Remark IV.3
The name of definition IV.1 may be someway misleading and has to be managed carefully.
Its origin arises observing that introduced the following:
Definition IV.2
graph of tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn):
the oriented graph [20] graph[tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn)] obtained by
tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn) replacing each element [ti−1,(j) · · · , ti,(j)) ∪ ∪
bi
k=1[ti,(k), ti+1,(k)) with a vertex ti
having one entering edge corresponding to the interval [ti−1,(j) · · · , ti,(j)) and having bi exiting edges corresponding
to the intervals [ti,(1), ti+1,(1)), · · · , [ti,(bi), ti+1,(bi)) (where we have denoted by t(0) ∈ (−∞, t1) the time parameter
before the first splitting)
graph[tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn)] is indeed a tree.
It is important, anyway, to remark that graph[tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn)] is only a diagrammatic way of
representing the different mathematical object tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn) that is not a graph and hence is
not, in particular, a tree.
Given a map f ∈ C∞(R), an initial time tin ∈ tree(t1, b1; · · · ; tn, bn) and a real number xin ∈ R:
Proposition IV.1
The Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (4.2)
x(tin) = xin (4.3)
is well-posed i.e. it admits one and only one solution
x˜(t) : (tree(t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn), T (t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn)) 7→ (R,+, ·)
12
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by multiple application of Proposition III.3 and Proposition III.5. 
Given i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and a1, · · · abi ∈ R let us now consider the generalized Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (4.4)
x(ti,(1)) = a1, · · · , x(ti,(bi)) = abi (4.5)
Then:
Proposition IV.2
The generalized Cauchy problem of eq. 4.4, eq. 4.5 is well-posed if and only if a1 = · · · = abi
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by multiple application of Proposition III.4. 
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V. THE TOY MODEL WITH A LESS TRIVIAL TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF TIME
Given the Visser splitting Split(R, (−∞, 0], 2), a map f ∈ C∞(R), tin ∈ (−∞, 0] and a1, a2 ∈ R let us consider the
generalized Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (5.1)
x(tin,(1)) = a1 (5.2)
x(tin,(2)) = a2 (5.3)
As usual we will say that the Cauchy problem of eq. 5.1, eq. 5.2 and eq. 5.3 is well-posed if and only if it has one
and only one solution x˜ : (Split(R, (−∞, 0], 2), T˜ (R, (−∞, 0], 2)) 7→ (R,+, ·).
Then:
Proposition V.1
The Cauchy problem of eq. 5.1, eq. 5.2 and eq. 5.3 is well-posed if and only if a1 = a2.
PROOF:
The condition a1 = a2 is necessary and sufficient for the merging of the solutions in the two branches (−∞1, 01] and
(−∞2, 02] in (0,+∞). 
We can now combine the Visser splittings of the form Split(R, [ti,+∞), n) and Split(R, [−∞, ti), n) to obtain more
intricate topological structures of time:
given n ∈ N+, t1, · · · , tn ∈ R such that t1 < t2 < · · · < tn, n natural numbers greater or equal than two
b1, b2, · · · , bn ∈ N : bi ≥ 2 i = 1, · · · , n, n − 1 natural numbers i1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , b1}, · · · , in−1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , bn} and n
boolean variables k1, · · · , kn ∈ {0, 1}:
Definition V.1
chronologically preordered temporal structure:
structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) :=
Split(· · ·Split(Split(R,Ω(t1), b1),Ωt2,(i1)t2,(i1), b2) · · · , [Ωtn,(in−1) , bn)) (5.4)
where:
Ω(t1) :=
{
[t1,+∞), if k1 = 0;
(−∞, t1], if k1 = 1
(5.5)
Ω(t2) :=
{
[t2,(i1),+∞(i1)), if k2 = 0;
(−∞(i1)), t2,(i1)], if k2 = 1
(5.6)
...
Ω(tn) :=
{
[tn,(in−1),+∞(in−1)), if kn = 0;
(−∞(in−1), tn,(in−1)], if kn = 1
(5.7)
The elements of structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) with ki = 0 will be called time-divisions while
the elements of structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) with ki = 1 will be called time-stickings.
Remark V.1
14
The terminology adopted in the definition V.1 is owed to the fact that the multiple application of definition II.3
induces on structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) the chronological relation chronological that, by the
multiple application of the proposition I.1, is a preordering.
Remark V.2
Let us remark that the iterated adoption of the definition II.2 induces a topol-
ogy on structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) that we will denote by
T (t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn).
Definition V.2
graph of structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn):
the oriented graph graph[structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)] obtained by
structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)
• replacing each time-division 〈ti−1,(j) · · · , ti,(j)) ∪ ∪
bi
k=1[ti,(k), ti+1,(k)〉 with a vertex ti having one entering edge
corresponding to the interval 〈ti−1,(j) · · · , ti,(j)) and having bi exiting edges corresponding to the intervals
[ti,(1), ti+1,(1)〉, · · · , [ti,(bi), ti+1,(bi)〉
• replacing each time-sticking ∪bik=1〈ti−1,(k), ti,(k)] ∪ (ti,(j), ti+1,j〉 with a vertex ti having bi entering edges corre-
sponding to the intervals 〈ti−1,(1), ti,(1)], · · · , 〈ti−1,(bi), ti,(bi)] and having one exiting edge corresponding to the
interval (ti,(j), ti+1,j〉
where we have denoted by ”〈” a parenthesis that can be a ”(” or a ”[” while we have denoted by ”〉” a parenthesis
that can be a ”)” or a ”]”.
Remark V.3
Such as definition V.1 is a generalization of definition IV.1 so definition V.2 is a generalization of definition IV.2.
As we have already done in the remark IV.3 as to temporal trees and their graphs
we remark here that structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) and its graph
graph[structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)] are two distinct mathematical notions.
Remark V.4
Let us observe that, taking into account the orientation of edges, graph[structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)]
doesn’t contain loops.
Given a map f ∈ C∞(R), an initial time tin ∈ structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) and a real
number xin ∈ R:
Proposition V.2
The Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (5.8)
x(tin) = xin (5.9)
is well-posed i.e. it admits one and only one solution
x˜(t) : (structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn, bn), T (t1, b1; t2,(i1), b2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn)) 7→ (R,+, ·)
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by Proposition IV.1. 
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VI. THE INTRODUCTION OF CHRONOLOGICAL CIRCULARITIES IN THE TOY MODEL
In this section we will consider topologies of time giving rise to causal circularities.
Let us start from the simplest case:
given the topological space (R, Tnatural(R)) and two points t1, t2 ∈ R : t1 < t2:
Definition VI.1
identification of t1 and t2 on R:
Identification(R; t1, t2) :=
(R, Tnatural(R))
∼t1,t2
(6.1)
where ∼t1,t2 is the equivalence relation over R:
a ∼t1,t2 b := ∃n ∈ Z : b = a+ n(t2 − t1) (6.2)
Let us consider in particular the case Identification(R; 0, 2pi) that is nothing but the circle S1 endowed with the
induced quotient topology.
Given f ∈ C∞(R), tin ∈
R
∼0,2pi
and xin ∈ R as usual we will say that the Cauchy-problem:
x˙ = f(x) (6.3)
x(tin) = xin (6.4)
is well defined if and only it has one and only one solution ˜˜x(t) : Identification(R; 0, 2pi) 7→ (R,+, ·).
Denoted by x˜(t) : R 7→ R the solution of eq.6.3, eq. 6.4 for ordinary real time we have clearly that:
Proposition VI.1
The Cauchy problem of eq. 6.3, eq. 6.4 is well-defined if and only if:
(t1 ∼0,2pi t2 ⇒ x˜(t1) = x˜(t2)) ∀t1, t2 ∈ R (6.5)
in which case the solution is:
˜˜x([t]∼0,2pi ) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ R (6.6)
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by the definition VI.1 
Let us then consider the introduction of causal circularities in the topological space (structure(0, 2, 0), T (0, 2, 0));
at this purpose let us identify the point −pi ∈ (−∞, 0) and the point +pi(1) ∈ [0(1),+∞(1)) through the following:
Definition VI.2
identification of −pi and +pi(1) on structure(0, 2, 0):
Identification[structure(0, 2, 0);−pi,+pi(1)] :=
(structure(0, 2, 0), T (0, 2, 0))
∼−pi,+pi(1)
(6.7)
where ∼−pi,+pi(1) is the equivalence relation over structure(0, 2, 0) :
a ∼−pi,+pi(1) b := ∃n ∈ Z : b = a+ n[pi(1) − (−pi)] (6.8)
Definition VI.3
graph of Identification[structure(0, 2, 0);−pi,+pi(1)]:
graph{Identification[structure(0, 2, 0);−pi,+pi(1)]} := the graph obtained from graph[structure(0, 2, 0)] by the
identification of the edge containing −pi and the edge containing +pi(1).
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Given f ∈ C∞(R), tin ∈
structure(0,2,0)
∼−pi,+pi(1)
and xin ∈ R as usual we will say that the Cauchy-problem:
x˙ = f(x) (6.9)
x(tin) = xin (6.10)
is well defined if and only it has one and only one solution ˜˜x(t) : Identification[structure(0, 2, 0);−pi,+pi(1)] 7→
(R,+, ·).
Denoted by x˜(t) : R 7→ R the solution of eq. 6.9, eq. 6.4 for ordinary real time we have clearly that:
Proposition VI.2
The Cauchy problem of eq. 6.9, eq. 6.10 is well-defined if and only if:
a ∼−pi,pi(1) b ⇒ x˜(a) = x˜(b) (6.11)
in which case the solution is:
˜˜x([t]∼−pi,+pi(1) ) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ R (6.12)
PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by the definition VI.2 
Let us now consider a chronologically preordered structure structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)
with k1 := 1 and kn := 0 so that the graph graph{structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn)} has b1 input
edges and bn output edges.
Given tA,(i) ∈ (−∞(i), t1,(i)), i ∈ N+ : i ≤ b1 and tB,(j) ∈ (tn,(j),+∞(j)), j ∈ N+ : j ≤ b1:
Definition VI.4
identification of tA,(i) and tB,(j) on structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn):
Identification[structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn); tA,(i), tB,(j)] :=
(structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn), T (t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn))
∼tA,(i),tB,(j)
(6.13)
where ∼tA,(i),tB,(j) is the equivalence relation over structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn) :
a ∼tA,(i),tB,(j) b := ∃n ∈ Z : b = a+ n(tB,(j) − tA,(i)) (6.14)
Given f ∈ C∞(R), tin ∈
structure(t1,b1,k1;t2,(i1),b2,k2;··· ;tn,(in−1),bn,kn)
∼tA,(i),tB,(j)
and xin ∈ R as usual we will say that the
Cauchy-problem:
x˙ = f(x) (6.15)
x(tin) = xin (6.16)
is well defined if and only it has one and only one solution ˜˜x(t) :
Identification[structure(t1, b1, k1; t2,(i1), b2, k2; · · · ; tn,(in−1), bn, kn); tA,(i), tB,(j)] 7→ (R,+, ·).
Denoted by x˜(t) : R 7→ R the solution of eq. 6.15, eq. 6.16 for ordinary real time we have clearly that:
Proposition VI.3
The Cauchy problem of eq. 6.15, eq. 6.16 is well-defined if and only if:
a ∼tA,(i),tB,(j) b ⇒ x˜(a) = x˜(b) (6.17)
in which case the solution is:
˜˜x([t]∼tA,(i),tB,(j) ) := x˜(t) ∀t ∈ R (6.18)
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PROOF:
The thesis immediately follows by the definition VI.4 
We can then suppose to perform more than an identification, resulting in the following:
Definition VI.5
temporal structure:
any topological space that can be obtained applying to a chronologically preordered temporal structure a finite
number of identifications
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VII. CONCLUSIONS LEARNT FROM THE TOY MODEL
The analysis of the toy model performed in the previous sections taught us that:
• as soon as the topological structure of time is chronologically preordered (so that the quotient with respect to
such a preordering is a partial, and in the occurring case actually linear, ordering):
– any single initial condition for the system represented by the model is the cause of its state at chronologically
later times and is the effect of its state at chronologically previous times; parallel timelines are physically
identical.
– multiple initial conditions at any time-division point are the cause of the state at chronologically later
times and are the effect of the state at chronologically previous times if and only if they are identical, once
again leading to physically identical parallel timelines; if such a consistency condition is not satisfied no
causation occurs.
• if chronological circularities are introduced in the topological structure of time, causation occurs if and only
if suitable consistency conditions hold; in this case no mathematical contradiction arises from the existence of
chronology violation 5: in such a situation an event A may be both the cause and the effect of an event B
without logical inconsistencies.
5 It should be remarked that in the toy model the existence of chronological violation may be defined as the condition that chronological
fails to be a preordering; hence, with this respect, the nonrelativistic toy model differs from the general relativistic situation in which,
as stated by the proposition I.1 , the chronological relation is still a preordering over the chronology violating set failing to be a partial
ordering.
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VIII. VISSER’S MULTIHISTORY APPROACH TO TIME-TRAVEL PARADOXES
The first mathematical result interrelating the removal of the assumption that space-time, as a topological space,
has to be Hausdorff and time-travel has been given (implicitly) by Petr Hajicek in the Theorem 4 of [16] that implies
the existence, on a non Hausdorff space time (M, gab), of a deep interrelation between the presence of chronology
violations, i.e. the situation in which Vchronology(M, gab) 6= ∅, and the presence of time-like bifurcating paths.
Of particular interest is Hajicek’s analysis about Cauchy problems on non-Hausdorff topological spaces and bifur-
cating solutions that we will analyze, again, in a simple model.
Given a non-Hausdorff topological space (S, T ) let us consider an alternative toy model, someway dual to the one
discussed in the previous sections (and that we will call therefore the dual toy model), in that it is its configuration
space to be an non Hausdorff topological space, being (S, T ), while time is assumed to be described by the topologically
trivial real line R. Let us suppose that such a dynamical system is ruled by the differential equation x˙ = f(x) where
f is a continuous function on (S, T ).
Given tin ∈ R and xin ∈ S Hajicek analyzes the situation in which the Cauchy problem:
x˙ = f(x) (8.1)
x(tin) = xin (8.2)
has two solutions α1 and α2 bifurcating at a time tbif ∈ R : tbif > tin (see appendix B).
According to our terminology such a dynamical system is still deterministic though no causal relationships exist
between its states at different times.
Giving up the assumption that space-time has to be Hausdorff doesn’t allow, by itself , to furnish a mathematical
solution to the so-called time-travel paradoxes belonging to Matt Visser’s option ”Radical Rewrite Conjecture” [14],
i.e. allowing changes of the past by a free-will’s owner.
An example of how this can be performed adding some other ingredient to the permission of non-Hausdorff space-
times has been given by Matt Visser:
given a solution (M, gab) of Einstein’s equation such that Vchronoloy(M, gab) 6= ∅Matt Visser’s multihistory approach
to the emerging so-called time travel paradoxes may be formalized as the addiction to General Relativity of the
following:
AXIOM VIII.1
If a free-will’s owner changes the past in p ∈ Vchronoloy(M, gab) then the following phase transition of the Universe
occurs:
M → Split(M,J+(p), 2) (8.3)
The analogous of axiom VIII.1 for our non relativistic toy model would consists in the following:
AXIOM VIII.2
If a free-will’s owner changes the past at time t1 ∈ X then the following phase transition in the topological structure
of time occurs:
X → Split(X, t1, 2) (8.4)
where X is the temporal structure describing time before the action of the free-will’s owner.
Let us call x1 the value that x(t1) would have had if the free-will’s owner hadn’t changed the past at t1.
So the following generalized Cauchy problem faces us:
x˙ = f(x) (8.5)
x(t1,(1)) = x1 (8.6)
x(t1,(2)) = x2 (8.7)
where x2 6= x1 is the new initial condition chosen by the free-will’s owner.
By the conclusions summarized in the section VII it follows that the changes of the past break any causational
relation.
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IX. WARNING
A slightly extended version of this paper (containing figures and some example) is available at the author’s homepage
http://www.gavrielsegre.com
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APPENDIX A: PREORDERINGS
In this appendix we will briefly recall the basic notions concerning relations over sets.
For the proof of the propositions, rather elementary, we demand to [21].
Given a set S:
Definition A.1
relation over S :
R ∈ P(S × S) (A1)
where P(S) := {X : X ⊆ S} is the power-set of S.
Given a relation R over S let us introduce the useful notation:
xRy := (x, y) ∈ R (A2)
Let us then introduce the following basic:
Definition A.2
R is a preordering:
•
xRx ∀x ∈ S (A3)
•
(x1Rx2 ∧ x2Rx3 ⇒ x1Rx3) ∀x1, x2, x3 ∈ S (A4)
Definition A.3
equivalence relation over S:
a preordering ∼ over S such that:
(x1 ∼ x2 ⇒ x2 ∼ x1) ∀x1, x2 ∈ S (A5)
Given an equivalence relation ∼ over S and x ∈ S:
Definition A.4
equivalence class of x w.r.t. ∼:
[x]∼ := {y ∈ S : x ∼ y} (A6)
Definition A.5
quotient of S w.r.t. ∼:
S
∼
:= {[x]∼, x ∈ S} (A7)
Given a preordering  over S and x1, x2 ∈ S:
Definition A.6
x1 ∼ x2 := x1  x2 ∧ x2  x1 (A8)
Proposition A.1
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∼ is an equivalence relation over S
Definition A.7
partial ordering over S:
a preordering  over S such that:
(x1 ∼ x2 ⇒ x1 = x2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ S (A9)
Definition A.8
linear ordering over S:
a partial ordering  over S such that:
(x1  x2 ∨ x2  x1) ∀x1, x2 ∈ S (A10)
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APPENDIX B: NON HAUSDORFF TOPOLOGICAL SPACES
In this appendix we will briefly recall the basic notions concerning topological spaces with a particular emphasis to
non Hausdorff ones.
For the proof of the propositions, rather elementary, we demand to [19].
Given a set S:
Definition B.1
topology over S:
T ∈ P(S) :
•
∅, S ∈ T (B1)
•
O1, O2 ∈ T ⇒ O1 ∩O2 ∈ T (B2)
•
Oi ∈ T ∀i ∈ I ⇒ ∪i∈IOi ∈ T (B3)
where P(S) := {X : X ⊆ S} is the power-set of S and where I is an arbitrary index set of arbitrary cardinality.
We will denote the set of all the topologies over S by TOP(S).
Let us observe first of all that:
Proposition B.1
• discrete topology over S :=
Tdiscrete(S) := P(S) ∈ TOP (S) (B4)
• indiscrete topology over S :=
Tindiscrete(S) := {∅, S} ∈ TOP (S) (B5)
Given T1, T2 ∈ TOP (S):
Definition B.2
T1 is coarser than T2 (T2 is finer than T1)
T1  T2 := T1 ⊆ T2 (B6)
Given T ∈ TOP (S) and x1, x2 ∈ S
Definition B.3
x1 g x2 := O1 ∩O2 6= ∅ ∀O1, O2 ∈ T : x1 ∈ O1 ∧ x2 ∈ O2 (B7)
Definition B.4
T is Hausdorff:
¬(x1 g x2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ S (B8)
We will denote the set of all the Hausdorff topologies over S by TOPHausdorff (S).
Proposition B.2
24
•  is a partial ordering over TOP(S)
•
Tindiscrete(S)  T ∀T ∈ TOP (S) (B9)
•
T  Tdiscrete(S) ∀T ∈ TOP (S) (B10)
•
Tindiscrete(S) /∈ TOPHausdorff (S) (B11)
•
Tdiscrete(S) ∈ TOPHausdorff (S) (B12)
•
T1 ∈ TOPHausdorff (S) ∧ T1  T2 ⇒ T2 ∈ TOPHausdorff (S) (B13)
Definition B.5
topological space:
a couple (S, T ):
• S is a set
• T ∈ TOP (S)
Given a topological space (S, T ) the elements of T are called the open sets of (S, T ).
Definition B.6
(S, T ) is Hausdorff:
T ∈ TOPHausdorff (S) (B14)
Given A ⊂ S:
Definition B.7
A is closed:
S −A ∈ T (B15)
Definition B.8
closure of A:
A¯ := the smallest closed set containing A
Definition B.9
interior of A:
A◦ := the largest open set contained in A
Definition B.10
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boundary of A:
∂A := A¯−A◦ (B16)
Given {Oi}i∈I : Oi ∈ T ∀i ∈ I:
Definition B.11
{Oi}i∈I is a base of (S, T ):
∀O ∈ T ∃I ′ : O = ∪i∈I′Oi (B17)
Clearly a base in a topological space individuates univocally the underlying topology.
Definition B.12
natural topology over R:
Tnatural(R) ∈ TOP (R) : {(a, b), a, b ∈ R : a < b} is a base of (R, Tnatural(R)) (B18)
Proposition B.3
Tnatural(R) ∈ TOPHausdorff (S) (B19)
We will assume from here and beyond that R, as a topological space, is endowed with the natural topology
Tnatural(R).
Given a topological space X = (S, T ) let us suppose to have an equivalence relation ∼ over S.
Definition B.13
quotient of X w.r.t. ∼:
the topological space X
∼
:= ( S
∼
, T
∼
) where T
∼
:= {[O] : O ∈ T }
Definition B.14
The equivalence relation ∼ is Hausdorff:
X
∼
is an Hausdorff topological space
Given two equivalence relations ∼1 and ∼2 over S:
Definition B.15
intersection of ∼1 and ∼2:
the equivalence relation ∼1 ∧ ∼2 over S such that:
x ∼1 ∧ ∼2 y := x ∼1 y ∧ x ∼2 y (B20)
Then:
Proposition B.4
∼1 Hausdorff ∧ ∼2 Hausdorff ⇒ ∼1 ∧ ∼2 Hausdorff (B21)
Given two topological spaces (S1, T1) and (S2, T2) and a map f : S1 7→ S2:
Definition B.16
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f is continuous:
f−1(O) ∈ T1 ∀O ∈ T2 (B22)
Given a topological space (S, T ):
Definition B.17
path in (S,T):
α : (R, Tnatural(R)) 7→ (S, T ) continuous (B23)
Given two path α1 and α2 in (S,T) and a number tbif ∈ R:
Definition B.18
α1 and α2 bifurcate at tbif :
α1(t) = α2(t) ∀t ∈ (−∞, tbif ) (B24)
α1([tbif ,+∞)) ∩ α2([tbif ,+∞]) = ∅ (B25)
Proposition B.5
∃α1 and α2 paths in (S,T) bifurcating at tbif ∈ R ⇒ (S,T) is not Hausdorff
PROOF:
By definition B.18 α1(tbif )g α2(tbif ). 
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APPENDIX C: DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS ON NON HAUSDORFF TOPOLOGICAL SPACES
Given a set S which is the minimal suppletive mathematical structure T through which we have to endow S in
order that on (S, T ) differential calculus may be defined ?
To answer such a deep question goes far beyond the goals of this paper.
For our purposes it will be enough to observe that as to the definition of limits, a metric structure is a too
strong requirement since the induced topology is Hausdorff; contrary the assignment of a topology T (not necessarily
Hausdorff) is sufficient:
given a map f : S 7→ S on the topological space (S, T ) and two point x1, x2 ∈ S:
Definition C.1
f tends to x2 as x tends to x1:
lim
x→x1
f(x) = x2 := ∀O2 ∈ T : x2 ∈ O2 ∃O1 ∈ T : x1 ∈ O1 ∧ (f(x) ∈ O2∀x ∈ O1) (C1)
In a similar way, given two sets S1 and S2, a map f : S1 7→ S2 and two point x1,∈ S1 and x2,∈ S2 the assignment
of a topology T1 on S1 and of a topology T2 on S2 is sufficient to define limits:
Definition C.2
f tends to x2 as x tends to x1:
lim
x→x1
f(x) = x2 := ∀O2 ∈ T2 : x2 ∈ O2 ∃O1 ∈ T1 : x1 ∈ O1 ∧ (f(x) ∈ O2∀x ∈ O1) (C2)
As to the definition of the derivative of f the assignment of two topologies on domain and codomain is not sufficient.
It is in fact necessary to require that S2 has the algebraic structure of being a field w.r.t. two internal binary
operations + and ·.
One can then introduce the following:
Definition C.3
derivative of f in x1:
f ′(x1) := lim
x→x1
f(x)− f(x1)
x− x1
(C3)
Clearly the definition C.3 may be iterated in order to define derivatives of of any order.
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